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INTRODUCTION

S

tatelessness is the lack of legally recognized citizenship.
This condition affects an estimated twelve million people
worldwide.1 Because stateless persons are not associated with a
nation-state, they are frequently overlooked for care.2 The consequences of statelessness frequently lead to compounding human rights abuses, including human trafficking, oppression,
and neglect.3 Few solutions exist for statelessness absent compelling nation-states to recognize citizenship. Intercountry
adoption is another solution for statelessness and coincidentally, as this article will illustrate, intercountry adoption is growing in demand but contracting in available sending states. This
Article proposes a nexus of statelessness and intercountry
adoption where legislation is put forward to adopt stateless individuals, particularly children. This Article analyzes pending
legislation for the adoption of North Korean stateless persons
and recommends legislation to address broader issues of statelessness.
I. INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION BACKGROUND
The first documented intercountry adoptions began in the
United States in the late 1940s.4 Ushered in largely by the effects of World War II, intercountry adoption initially sought to
assist children orphaned by parents killed in the war.5 The
1. Stateless
People,
UNHCR:
THE
UN
REFUGEE
AGENCY,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c155.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
2. See Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75 (2010).
3. Id.
4. See Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA
L.J. 317, 321 n.25 (1988) (providing an overview of the impact of World War
II on intercountry adoption); see also ELIZABETH BARTHOLET & JOAN HEIFETZ
HOLLINGER, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: OVERVIEW, in ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE §§ 10.02[1], 10.05 to 10.06 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2010) (providing
a brief history of intercountry adoption); Kate O’Keeffe, Note, The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000: The United States’ Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, and Its Meager Effect on International
Adoption, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1611, 1615–18 (2007).
5. See 56 Orphaned by War Due Today at Idlewild, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1949, at 8 (describing how orphans caused by deaths during World War II
prompted adoptions); How to Adopt a Child in Mexico: Three-Stage Process,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1984, § V, at 26, col. 1. (describing the difficulties of U.S.
citizens’ adoption of children from Mexico in the 1980s); Ginger Thompson,
After Haiti Quake, the Chaos of U.S. Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010),
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United States is the world’s largest “receiving” country, accepting almost two-thirds of all intercountry adopted children.6
From World War II to 2004, the number of intercountry
adoptions in the United States increased through a series of
waves produced by foreign crises and changes in social conditions.7 From the first intercountry adoptions in 1944, the number of annual adoptions rose to 22,990 in 2004.8 However, after
2004, the number of intercountry adoptions rapidly declined by
over half in the following six years, dropping to 11,059 in 2010.9
Intercountry adoptions declined as a result of increased adoption costs, additional regulations, and the closing of several
“sending” countries.10
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) collects data from fifty-eight countries with stateless populations.11 The data UNHCR collects is not exhaustive,
as several countries with stateless populations are not identified by UNHCR, including China and the Dominican Republic.12 The following chart identifies the national population and
number of adoptions in the United States from fifty-eight countries. Data from 2009 was selected for purposes of this Article
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/world/americas/04adoption.html (describing how the earthquake in Haiti prompted an influx of international adoptions to the United States).
6. PETER SELMAN, THE MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN FOR INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION: A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 7 (2001), www.archiveiussp.org/Brazil2001/s20/S27_P05_Selman.pdf. America is also a “sending”
country, although this is a relatively uncommon occurrence. Anne-Marie
O’Neill, Why Are American Babies Being Adopted Abroad?, PEOPLE MAG.
(June
6,
2005),
http://
www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20147746,00.html.
7. Carlson, supra note 4, at 318.
8. See also Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: A Way Forward,
55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 687, 688 (2010–2011) [hereinafter Bartholet, A Way
Forward].
9. See id.
10. See Kathryn Joyce, The Evangelical Adoption Crusade, NATION (Apr.
21, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/160096/evangelical-adoptioncrusade#. Countries such as Guatemala and China have heavily restricted
international adoption, which has impacted the number of adoptions into
America. Also, nine other smaller countries have completely closed off adoption as a result of ethical scandals and child trafficking concerns, while dozens of other countries have placed heavy restrictions on international adoptions. Id.
11. Stateless People, supra note 1.
12. Id.
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because it provides the most recent data on orphans. Adoptions
to the United States from countries with stateless populations
represent approximately 36% of all intercountry adoptions received by the United States. Additionally, twenty-eight of fiftyeight countries, or 48% of countries listed, allow the United
States to receive children through intercountry adoption. Consequently, stateless persons are not beyond the reach of intercountry adoption. Significant populations of stateless persons
live in countries with a functioning framework for adoption
with the United States.
Exhibit A. All Adoptions to the United States from Countries
with Stateless Populations
Countries with stateless
populations

2009 population

Adoptions to U.S. in
2009

Austria

8,210,281

0

Azerbaijan

8,238,672

0

Belarus

9,648,533

0

Belgium

10,414,336

0

4,613,414

3

Burma (Myanmar)

48,137,741

0

Colombia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

45,644,023

238

Croatia

4,489,409

0

Denmark

5,500,510

0

83,082,869

2

Estonia

1,299,371

9

Finland

5,250,275

0

France

64,057,792

0

Georgia

4,615,807

0

Egypt

Germany

82,329,758

0

Greece

10,737,428

2

9,905,596

7

306,694

0

Iraq

28,945,657

0

Italy

58,126,212

2

127,078,679

43

15,399,437

296

Hungary
Iceland

Japan
Kazakhstan
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Adoptions to U.S. in
2009

Kenya

39,002,772

21

Kuwait

2,691,158

0

Kyrgyzstan

5,431,747

19

Latvia

2,231,503

28

Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia

34,761

0

3,555,179

22

491,775

0

2,066,718

1

Malaysia

25,715,819

1

Moldova

4,320,748

5

Mongolia

3,041,142

8

672,180

0

Nepal

28,563,377

6

Netherlands

16,715,999

0

Norway

4,660,539

0

Panama

3,360,474

0

Poland

38,482,919

50

Portugal

10,707,924

0

833,285

0

22,215,421

5

140,041,247

1,588

28,686,633

0

Serbia

7,379,339

4

Slovakia

5,463,046

0

South Korea

48,508,972

1,079

Spain

40,525,002

0

Sweden

9,059,651

0

Switzerland

7,604,467

0

Montenegro

Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia

Syrian Arab Republic

20,178,485

0

Tajikistan

7,349,145

0

Thailand

65,905,410

58

Turkey

76,805,524

1

Turkmenistan
Ukraine

4,884,887

0

45,700,395

607
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2009

United Kingdom

61,113,205

3

Vietnam

86,967,524

481

Total Adoptions

4,589

A. Global Parties and Treaties
Several treaties and intermediary bodies govern or affect the
intercountry adoption process. The Convention on the Rights of
the Child (“CRC”), in particular, sets out the civil, political,
economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children.13 The
CRC defines a child as any human being under the age of
eighteen, unless the age of majority is attained earlier under a
state’s own domestic legislation.14 The CRC is considered “a
universally agreed set of non-negotiable standards and obligations . . . that should be respected by governments.”15 It is one
13. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 21, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC].
14. Id.
15. UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30160.html. The United States is the only
member of the United Nations that did not ratify the CRC. See Elizabeth
Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, 13
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151 (2007) [hereinafter Bartholet, Human Rights];
CRC, supra note 13. Article 21 of the CRC states:
Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by
competent authorities who determine, in accordance with
applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child’s status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons
concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption
on the basis of such counseling as may be necessary;
(b) Recognize that intercountry adoption may be considered
as an alternative means of the child’s care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in
any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of
origin;
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of the most widely ratified conventions; however, the United
States is not a signatory.16
The CRC addresses intercountry adoption in ways that many
view as anti-adoption.17 Under the auspices of UNHCR,18 the
CRC follows the “principal of solidarity,” which states that an
orphan should be placed in in-country foster care or any other
“suitable” form of orphan care before being considered for permanent intercountry adoption placement.19 While the CRC
“fails to proscribe specific procedures that should be followed”
in international adoption, it clearly places intercountry adop(c) Ensure that the child concerned by intercountry adoption
enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing in the case of national adoption;
(d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in intercountry adoption, the placement does not result in improper
financial gain for those involved in it;
(e) Promote, where appropriate, the objectives of the present
article by concluding bilateral or multilateral arrangements
or agreements, and endeavor, within this framework, to ensure that the placement of the child in another country is
carried out by competent authorities or organs.
Id.
16. Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
17. See, e.g., Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the Hague Convention: Does Implementation of the Convention Protect the Best Interests of
Children?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 379 (2007) (discussing
the CRC’s preference for institutionalization over out-of-country adoption);
see also Lisa M. Katz, Comment: A Modest Proposal? The Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 9
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 283, 304 (1995); Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note
15, at 154–55 (noting UNICEF’s “generally negative attitude to international
adoption” and noting that it “only grudgingly approves of such adoption, and
places it low on the hierarchy of alternatives for children in need”); UNICEF
Says ‘No’ to Inter-country Adoption, FREE LIBRARY (Jan. 5, 2005),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/UNICEF+Says+’No’+to+InterCountry+Adoption.-a0126700872 (noting UNICEF policy that intercountry
adoption should be considered as a “last resort” to tsunami victims).
18. Monitoring Human Rights, COMM. ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (Oct. 8,
2013), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/index.htm.
19. CRC, supra note 13; see also Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New International Law of Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 733, 736–37 (2010) (discussing the CRC).
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tion at the bottom of the hierarchy of possible orphan care solutions.20
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Adoption Convention”) sets out to provide universal guidelines and
standards for intercountry adoption, seeking to ensure adoptions are made in the best interests of the child and to prevent
the child from “abduction . . . sale . . . [or] traffic[king].”21 Signatories to the Hague Adoption Convention, including the
United States, agree to meet several requirements: establishing a “Central Authority” to serve as the country’s primary contact in adoption processes; satisfying several checks before
deeming a child eligible for adoption, including verifying the
propriety of the adoption under the laws of both countries and
making a reasonable effort to first facilitate a domestic adoption; and agreeing to use only certified adoption agencies.22
Initially, the Hague Adoption Convention planned to facilitate intercountry adoption and expedite placement. However,
the mandate of the convention changed to a “more single-

20. Elizabeth Long, Where Are They Coming from, Where Are They Going:
Demanding Accountability in International Adoption, 18 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 827, 834 (2012).
21. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Understanding the Hague Convention,
ADOPTION,
INTERCOUNTRY
http://adoption.state.gov/hague_convention/overview.php (last visited Feb. 17,
2012) [hereinafter Understanding the Hague Convention] (summarizing the
facts and process set forth by the Hague Adoption Convention for international adoption in the United States). The stated goals of the Hague Adoption
Convention are:
a) to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions
take place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his
or her fundamental rights as recognised in international law;
b) to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States
to ensure that those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent
the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children;
c) to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made
in accordance with the Convention.
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption art. 1, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167, 183 [hereinafter Hague Adoption Convention].
22. Understanding the Hague Convention, supra note 21; see also Hague
Adoption Convention, supra note 21.
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minded[] focus[] on preventing adoption abuses.”23 Generally,
the Hague Adoption Convention is viewed by scholars and advocates as more adoption-friendly than the CRC.
The preamble of the Hague Adoption Convention states that
“intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in
his or her State of origin.”24 Put differently, the Hague Adoption Convention prioritizes intercountry adoption over incountry foster care or institutions.25 These two international
laws significantly impact the way intercountry adoptions are
handled throughout the world.26
1. Government Legislation
Domestic leaders around the world take different views on
adoption, with some leaders staunchly supporting intercountry
adoptions27 and others foreboding it as a human rights violation.28 Nations prohibiting adoption may do so for religious rea23. See Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 15, at 154.
24. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21, pmbl.
25. See Richard Carlson, An Analysis of the Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, 30 TULSA L.J. 243, 255–65 (1994); see also Elizabeth Bartholet & David Smolin, The Debate, in INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: POLICIES,
PRACTICES,
AND
OUTCOMES
371,
373,
(2012),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/The_Debate_1_13_2012.pdf.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention or HCIA)
both defer to state sovereignty, leaving nation states free to ban international adoption altogether regardless of whether they can provide children with nurturing homes in the absence of such adoption.
Both provide that if countries choose to allow international adoption,
they should exercise a preference for placing children in-country.
Id.
26. Americans seeking to adopt in countries that have not signed the
Hague Adoption Convention may do so under the less stringent Orphan
Adoption Process. See Long, supra note 20. While permissible under U.S. law,
the Orphan Adoption Process provides fewer safeguards, particularly for
adoptive parents. Id.
27. U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu is considered to be a powerful advocate
for intercountry adoption. See, e.g., Sen. Mary Landrieu Helps Adoption
Standoff, MARY LANDRIEU: U.S. SENATOR FOR LA. (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.landrieu.senate.gov/?p=news&id=3343.
28. British politician Baroness Emma Nicholson fights hard against international adoption and views any orphan leaving his country for another as a
failure by the orphan’s nation. See, e.g., Emma Nicholson, Red Light on Hu-
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sons, as in Islamic countries, or for political reasons. Those who
ban adoption for political reasons, including Romania, view intercountry adoption as a shameful failure by the country to
care for its own children and, perhaps, such an implicit admission would invite further scrutiny into child welfare.29
2. Sending Countries
Legislators in sending countries have a different set of concerns than legislators in receiving countries. Legislators in
sending countries must determine where orphans in the country may be sent30 and set requirements for the type of people
who are qualified to adopt.31 When making decisions regarding
intercountry adoption, these policy makers are influenced by
internal pressure such as nationalism and fear of being seen as
failing to take care of “their own” orphans. Policy makers also
face external pressures from efforts by the United Nations
Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”) and other human rights organization that advocate for tougher adoption regulations.32
In countries where intercountry adoption is permitted, the
evolution of the legislative process often follows a similar pattern. First, adoptions are only lightly regulated. Second, reports of abusive practices surface. Third, political outrage
grows over the abusive practices and citizens call for reform
resulting in a “temporary” shut down of the program. Finally,
intercountry adoption programs re-open, but with heavy re-

man
Traffic,
GUARDIAN
(July
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2004/jul/01/adoptionandfostering.europe
anunion; Romania Bans International Adoption, CNN.COM/WORLD (June 22,
2001),
available
at
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/22/romania.adoption/.
29. See Andrew Bainham, International Adoption from Romania—Why the
Moratorium Should Not Be Ended, 15 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 223, 227–28 (2003).
30. For a full discussion on the role of domestic policy makers, see Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 15, at 166–70.
31. For example, China recently determined that people who are single or
obese may not adopt Chinese orphans. See CHINA: Intercountry Adoption,
OF
CONSULAR
AFFAIRS,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
BUREAU
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?coun
try-select=china (last visited Dec. 19, 2013); see also Pam Belluck & Jim
Yardley, China Tightens Adoption Rules for Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/us/20adopt.html.
32. Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 15, at 167.
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strictions.33 The response is frequently reactionary, with abuses caused by a few affecting the majority and making a wellintended process more difficult, thus deterring would-be families from adopting.
3. Receiving Countries
Policy makers in receiving countries also affect adoption by
regulating adoptions of children from other countries. For example, in the United States, federal lawmakers impacted international adoption by enacting the Intercountry Adoption Act
(the “Act”).34 The Act served as the United States’ implementation of the Hague Adoption Convention’s ideals and mechanisms.35 The Act governs any adoption between the United
States and another country that is a signatory to the Hague
Adoption Convention.36 Additionally, it preempts any state law
that is not in compliance with the Hague Adoption Convention
and also establishes its own provisions that go beyond those
required under the Hague Adoption Convention.37 Finally, the
Act names the U.S. State Department as the “Central Authority” for intercountry adoptions involving the United States.38
a. The U.S. State Department
Under the authority of the Act, the State Department worked
to build a regulatory framework to advance the ideals of both
the Hague Adoption Convention and the Intercountry Adoption

33. Id. (discussing China, Guatemala, and Russia following this pattern).
34. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954 (2006).
35. Adoption Process: Intercountry Adoption, BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://adoption.state.gov/adoption_process.php
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954 (2006).
37. Long, supra note 20, at 847.
The IAA is an American-drafted piece of legislation that serves to aid
the implementation of the Hague Adoption Convention in the United
States. Confusing the IAA with the Convention results in misguided
criticism of the statute based on a separate piece of legislation, rather than on the international statute’s requirements.
Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954 (2006).
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Act.39 Under these regulations, Americans seeking to adopt a
child must apply to the State Department, which then prepares
a file on the potential adoptive parents’ “identity, eligibility and
suitability to adopt, background, family and medical history,
social environment, reasons for adoption, ability to undertake
intercountry adoption, as well as the characteristics of the children for whom they would be qualified to care.”40
Additionally, the State Department is charged with certifying
adoption agencies under the Hague Adoption Convention.41 The
stringent requirements of the Hague Adoption Convention, Intercountry Adoption Act, and the State Departments’ own regulations have led to as many as 15% of pre-Hague American
adoption agencies shutting down.42 Moreover, the State Department monitors the adoption practices of other countries,
and in some cases, prohibits Americans from adopting from
countries where abusive practices are suspected.43
The Hague Adoption Convention presents challenges and opportunities for the adoption of stateless children. On the one
hand, the convention provides a fluid process between the two
countries that ratified the document.44 Some countries with
stateless populations have signed and ratified the convention,
and others practice the convention without formally agreeing to
it.45 However, several countries with stateless populations are
not signatories. Even if a country is not a signatory, adoptions
can still take place between a Hague ratifying country and a

39. Trish Maskew, The Failure of Promise: The U.S. Regulations on Intercountry Adoption under the Hague Convention, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 487, 494
(2008).
40. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21, art. 15(1).
41. See Long, supra note 20, at 845. Due to the stringent requirements of
the Hague Adoption Convention, the U.S. State Department initially had a
heavy backlog of over 300 agency applications. Id. at 846.
42. Advocacy groups have claimed that over 15% of American adoption
agencies closed down because they could not meet the requirements of certification by the State Department. Id. at 846 n.192; see also Dan Frosch, New
Rules and Economy Strain Adoption Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/us/11adopt.html.
43. See Alerts and Notices: Intercountry Adoptions, BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/alerts_notices.php (last visited
Feb. 17, 2012) (listing countries with adoption notices or alerts).
44. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21.
45. Id.
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non-convention country.46 On the other hand, the Hague Adoption Convention poses some obstacles, particularly when both
the sending and receiving countries have signed and ratified
the convention. For instance, the Hague Adoption Convention
imposes stricter requirements for documentation and proof
that the child is in fact an orphan.47 Such documents may be
nonexistent in the case of stateless children, and proof that the
child is an orphan may rely in part on circumstantial evidence.48 As a result, the intercountry adoption of stateless children may prove easier from countries that are not signatories
to the Hague Adoption Convention because they do not have an
additional bureaucratic step. The following chart lists the
Hague Adoption Convention status of countries with documented stateless populations.
Exhibit B. Countries with Stateless Populations and Hague
Status
Countries with
stateless
populations

Hague
Hague
Hague
Entry into
Nonsignature ratification acceptance
force
Convention

Austria

x

Azerbaijan

—

—

x

x

—

Belarus

x

x

—

x

—

Belgium

x

x

—

x

—

—

x

—

x

—

—

—

—

—

x

Colombia

x

x

—

x

—

Croatia

—

—

—

—

x

Denmark

x

x

—

x

—

Egypt

—

—

—

—

x

Estonia

—

x

—

x

—

Finland

x

x

—

x

—

France

x

x

—

x

—

Georgia

—

x

—

x

—

Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Burma
(Myanmar)

46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
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Hague
Hague
Hague
Entry into
Nonsignature ratification acceptance
force
Convention

Germany

x

x

—

x

—

Greece

x

x

—

x

—

Hungary

x

x

—

x

—

Iceland

—

—

x

x

—

Iraq

—

—

—

—

x

Italy

x

x

—

x

—

Japan

—

—

—

—

x

Kazakhstan

—

—

x

x

—

Kenya

—

—

x

x

—

Kuwait

—

—

—

—

x

Kyrgyzstan

—

—

—

—

x

Latvia

x

x

—

x

—

Liechtenstein

—

—

x

x

—

Lithuania

—

x

—

x

—

Luxembourg

x

x

—

x

—

Macedonia

—

—

x

x

—

Malaysia

—

—

—

—

x

Moldova

—

—

x

x

—

Mongolia

—

—

x

x

—

Montenegro

—

—

—

—

x

Nepal

—

—

—

—

x

Netherlands

x

x

—

x

—

Norway

x

x

—

x

—

Panama

x

x

—

x

—

Poland

x

x

—

x

—

Portugal

x

x

—

x

—

Qatar

—

—

—

—

x

Romania

x

x

—

x

—

Russian
Federation

x

—

—

—

x

Saudi Arabia

—

—

—

—

x

Serbia

—

—

—

—

x

Slovakia

x

x

—

x

—

South Korea

—

—

—

—

x
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Hague
Hague
Hague
Entry into
Nonsignature ratification acceptance
force
Convention

Spain

—

—

—

—

x

Sweden

x

x

—

x

—

Switzerland

x

x

—

x

—

Syrian Arab
Republic

—

—

—

—

x

Tajikistan

—

—

—

—

x

Thailand

x

x

—

x

—

Turkey

x

x

—

x

—

Turkmenistan

—

—

—

—

x

Ukraine

—

—

—

—

x

United Kingdom

x

x

—

x

—

Viet Nam

x

x

—

x

—

37

20

Total Number

b. Other Stakeholders
UNICEF impacts the adoption discussion in two ways. First,
UNICEF prepares estimates of both the number of orphans in
the world and the frequency of adoption abuses.49 Second,
UNICEF promotes an agenda of increased regulations and
burdens on intercountry adoption.50 UNICEF has been working
to combat statelessness by registering children in their country
of birth or residence.51 Perhaps intercountry adoption would
work against UNICEF’s goals as it would give nation-states
denying citizenship an alternative—to pass the handling of the
stateless child problem to another country.

49. To understand the relevance of this, see supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text.
50. Long supra note 20 at 836–38.
51. Millions of Asian Children Living in Stateless Limbo, UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_31593.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
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II. STATELESSNESS BACKGROUND
A. Defining Statelessness
Statelessness is a frequently overlooked global struggle affecting an estimated 11–15 million individuals around the
globe who lack citizenship.52 Citizenship is the key to the door
of basic human rights, such as education, health care, employment, and equality.53 Without citizenship, it is difficult for
stateless individuals to exercise these basic human rights. Despite the growing problem of statelessness and the severe vulnerability of those affected, the international response has been
minimal.54

52. See Indira Goris, Julia Harrington & Sebastian Köhn, Statelessness:
What It Is and Why It Matters, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Apr. 2009, at 4, 4,
available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/04-06.pdf. As described in an appeal for why statelessness matters, an article by Goris, Harrington, and Köhn quipped:
For many of us, citizenship only really matters when we travel
abroad, when the Olympic Games are on, or when we vote in national elections. We do not think about our citizenship on a daily basis.
For others, citizenship is an ever-present issue, and often an obstacle. Because recognition of nationality serves as a key to a host of
other rights, such as education, health care, employment, and equality before the law, people without citizenship—those who are ‘stateless’—are some of the most vulnerable in the world.
Id.
53. Id.
54. See Thawdar, Bleak Future for Burmese Stateless Children, IRRAWADDY
(July 11, 2009), http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16310&page=1
[hereinafter Bleak Future]. The Irrawaddy is a Southeast Asian newspaper
based in Northern Thailand that reports on regional matters with an eye
particularly toward political matters and current events in Burma (Myanmar). In the article Bleak Future for Burmese Stateless Children, the newspaper reported on the migration of street children from Burma to Thailand.
The Irrawaddy profiled the issue and its international response.
“Shockingly little is being done to protect the basic rights of millions
of stateless children around the world,” said Maureen Lynch of Refugees International’s Senior Advocate for Stateless Initiatives, and
author of Futures Denied.
“These children are stigmatized and blocked from such basic services
as health care and education because a government won’t recognize
them as citizens,” she said.
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Statelessness is the condition of not possessing recognized
citizenship in a state or nation.55 “People are stateless because
they did not acquire a nationality at birth, their state of origin
no longer exists, or no state will accept them as citizens.”56
UNHCR estimated in 2009 that 12 million people worldwide
are stateless—“they are not considered as nationals by any
State under the operation of its law.”57 According to the State
Department, data on statelessness is so limited that the international community does not even know if the numbers are
growing or shrinking.58
Statelessness is a condition caused by governments, rather
than by the actions of individuals.59 Gaps in international law
Lynch also said, “Although the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that everyone has the right to a nationality, these children are forced into an underclass with little hope for the future
through no fault of their own.”
Id.
55. 4 GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL GUIDE TO CITIZENS’ RIGHTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 128 (C. Neal Tate ed., 2006).
56. Id.
57. DIV. OF INT’L PROTECTION, UNHCR, UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS
STATELESSNESS:
A
STRATEGY
NOTE
4
(2010),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4b9e0c3d2.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR
STRATEGY NOTE]; see also Goris et al., supra note 52, at 4 (“Estimates of the
current number of stateless persons in the world range from 11 to 15 million.
There is not only a lack of systematic attention given to collecting reliable
statistics but also a lack of consensus on whom to include when counting
stateless people.”); UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org
(last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
58. See Samuel M. Witten & David J. Kramer, Imagine This: You Have No
Country, No Country Will Claim You, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG
(Sept. 16, 2008, 8:30 AM), http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2008/09/16/imagineyou-have-no-country-no-country-will-claim-you; see also BRAD K. BLITZ,
REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., STATELESSNESS, PROTECTION AND EQUALITY 9 (2009),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e5f3d572.html.
Some of the most widely cited cases of statelessness include minority
groups that have been formally excluded from the right to nationality such as the Rohingyas in Myanmar (+ 1 million), Pygmy Banyarwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1.5 million), Biharis in
Bangladesh (300,000), ethnic Ethiopians and Eritreans in the Horn
of Africa (500,000), and other groups such as the Meskhetian Turks
in Southern Russia (15,000).
Id.
59. See BLITZ, supra note 58, at 1.
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and the sovereignty of nation-states allow the phenomenon of
statelessness not only to exist, but also to continue relatively
unfettered. “International law traditionally affords states broad
discretion to define the contours of, and delimit access to, citizenship.”60 However, “[p]eople are vulnerable to statelessness
when governments determine citizenship based on descent,
race, ethnicity, or the whim of those in power.”61 The risk of allowing individual states to determine citizenship independently
is that those nations may define citizenship for the purpose of
discriminating against particular classes of people.62
People arrive at the condition of statelessness through one of
two different measures: (1) “de jure statelessness,” or (2) “de
facto statelessness.”
1. De Jure Statelessness
De jure statelessness occurs when there is no recognized
state to which a person may claim nationality and citizenship;63
for instance, when an individual’s state ceases to exist and
there is no successor state.64 Under the purview of UNHCR, the
de jure situation is recognized by both the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (“Status Convention”)
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
(“Statelessness Reduction Convention” or “1961 Convention”).65

60. James A. Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 321,
323 (2006).
61. GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL GUIDE TO CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 55, at 129.
62. See id. at 129–30.
63. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1,
Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, 136 (defining a stateless individual as “a
person not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its
law”).
64. De jure statelessness received pop culture attention through the 2004
movie The Terminal, where Tom Hanks plays a man who, while in transit
through the United States, learns that his home country’s government is
overthrown and that the new government is not recognized by the United
States. See THE TERMINAL (DreamWorks Pictures 2004).
65. Hugh Massey, UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness, in LEGAL AND
PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES (UNHCR No. 16 2010). Massey was
Senior Legal Advisor to UNHCR. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57, at
4.
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2. De Facto Statelessness
De facto statelessness occurs when a person possesses a legally meritorious claim for citizenship, but is precluded from
asserting it because of practical considerations such as cost,
circumstances of civil disorder, or fear of persecution.66 In de
facto situations, the state is often in existence, but the individual lacks protection of the laws by a mechanical failure of the
state.67 In other words, de facto stateless people lack an effective nationality.68 De facto statelessness may even include
those inside the state of their nationality. Categories of persons
fitting into de facto statelessness are: (1) persons who do not
enjoy the rights attached to their nationality; (2) persons who
are unable to establish their nationality, or who are of undetermined nationality; (3) persons who, in the context of state
succession, are attributed the nationality of a state other than
the state of their habitual residence.69
UNHCR’s responsibilities for stateless persons began with refugees
who are stateless under paragraph 6(A) (II) of its Statute and article
1(A) (2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(1951 Convention), both of which refer to stateless persons who meet
the criteria of the refugee definition. UNHCR’s mandate responsibilities concerning statelessness were expanded following the adoption
of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
(1954 Convention), and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (1961 Convention). General Assembly resolutions 3274
(XXIV) and 31/36 designated UNHCR as the body mandated to examine the cases of persons who claim the benefit of the 1961 Convention and to assist such persons in presenting their claims to the
appropriate national authorities.
Id.
66. See Massey, supra note 65, at ii.
[T]he Office has never clearly defined what de facto statelessness is,
nor what the legal and operational responses to de facto statelessness should be. In this respect, it should be noted that whereas an
international treaty regime has been developed for addressing problems of de jure statelessness—including most notably the 1954 and
1961 Statelessness Conventions—there is no such legally binding regime at the global level for de facto stateless persons who are not
refugees.
Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at i.
69. Id. at iii.
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In 2006, James A. Goldston described how nations were
wielding citizenship as a political weapon.70 “Across broad
swaths of the globe, the treatment of noncitizens—so-called
foreigners and aliens, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers,
stateless persons . . . is worsening precisely as states are increasingly bestowing, denying, or retracting citizenship as a
political weapon.”71
This Article will address both forms of statelessness broadly,
as both forms result in the stateless condition of orphans, although de facto statelessness has received less recognition within the international legal community.72
In a previous article entitled “Stateless,” I argue for a global
system of universal identification for stateless persons building
upon the foundation of the Nansen Passport, which I will briefly describe below.73 Extending this concept, “Adopting the
Stateless” presents a natural use and additional purpose for
universal identification for stateless persons.
B. A Brief History of Statelessness
In analyzing UNHCR policy, Hugh Massey, Senior Legal Advisor to UNHCR, noted that “[i]t was not until after the Second
World War that international action was taken to establish a
protection regime specifically for stateless persons.”74 In the
1920s, due to fallout from World War I, Europe found itself
with an influx of refugees spread across the continent.75 The
League of Nations established the Office international Nansen
pour les réfugiés (Nansen International Office for Refugees) to
oversee the refugee challenge.76 The League of Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“HCR”) was established in 1921
under the leadership of Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian explorer,

70. Id.
71. Goldston, supra note 60, at 322. Goldston estimates that “as many as
175 million worldwide—are not citizens of the countries in which they reside.” Id.
72. De facto statelessness is not recognized by the 1954 Convention on the
Prevention of Statelessness but it is covered by customary law and practices.
73. See generally Milbrandt, supra note 2.
74. Massey, supra note 65, at 1 (providing an elaborate history of postWorld War II conventions, treaties, and studies with respect to statelessness).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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scientist, and diplomat.77 This represented the first time that
the existence of refugees was analyzed as an international issue.78 The HCR crafted the “Nansen Passport” for refugees,
which was designed to be the first legal document that functioned to give refugees a legal existence and allow them to
travel more freely than in the past.79 The League of Nations
agreed to the establishment of Nansen Passports at the Geneva
Conference on July 5, 1922.80 Nansen Passports were used during the period between World Wars I and II, with approximately 450,000 passports issued, aiding those stateless individuals
to immigrate to a country willing to accept them.81
Nansen Passport documents were originally issued solely to
refugees fleeing civil war in Russia, but were subsequently offered to various other refugee communities, including Armeni77. A Century of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates: Fridtjof Nansen, INDIANA
UNIV. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, http://archive.is/s3di0 (last
visited Oct. 5, 2011).
Fridtjof Nansen was a Norwegian explorer, humanitarian, and
statesman. He led a number of scientific expeditions to Greenland
and the Arctic Ocean between 1888 and 1896 and accepted a faculty
position at the University of Oslo as a zoologist. Nansen was the
Norwegian delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, advocating the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations and
recognition of the rights of small states. He served as the Norwegian
delegate to the League of Nations from 1920 to 1930 and held a
number of high commissionerships. In this capacity he oversaw the
repatriation of Central Power prisoners of war from Russia (1920 to
1922), developed the Nansen Passport for refugees in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (1921), supervised food shipments to famine-stricken Russia (1921-1922), monitored the exchange of Greek
and Turkish refugees after the Turko-Greek War (1922), and
planned for a national home for Armenian refugees in Syria and
Lebanon (1925). Nansen received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1922 for
his humanitarian work with refugees. He died on May 13, 1930 near
Oslo.
Id.; see also Laura Barnett, Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 238, 242 (2002).
78. Barnett, supra note 77.
79. See id.
80. Id.; see also League of Nations Passport, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/333862/League-ofNations-Passport (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
81. Nansen Passport Donated to the Zohrab Center, ZOHRAB CTR.,
http://zohrabcenter.org/2010/08/20/nansen-passport-donated-to-the-zohrabcenter (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
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ans in 1924, and Turks, Assyrians, Syrians, Assyro-Chaldeans,
and Kurds by 1928.82 No state was required to permit the entry
or resettlement of refugees holding a Nansen Passport, but
every state that was a member of the League of Nations agreed
to recognize the documents as a valid form of identification.83
Fifty-two governments ratified the original arrangement and
issued Nansen Passports, but there was almost no defining
unity as to the format and requirements of the various documents produced by these countries.84 As a result, the power and
value of the document varied according to the host country as
well as the time period.85 Often, these travel documents took
the form of “nothing more than a sheet of paper (or . . . booklet)
with printed categories to be filled in by the issuer,” and a
space for the photograph and signature of the holder.86 This
wide array of documents, which came under the umbrella of
the Nansen Passport, could be seen as merely “a loose convergence of policy, paper, and personal information.”87 UNHCR
eventually assumed the role carried out by the Nansen International Office for Refugees.88
Although these documents served to facilitate cross-border
travel for many refugees, the documents provided no guarantees of protection from the state in which these individuals settled.89 In effect, these individuals were granted increased freedom of movement through the Nansen Passport, but the Nansen Passport did not assure the protection enjoyed by citizens
or nationals of the state in which they settled, such as personal
welfare, access to employment, protection against expulsion,

82. Esra Su, Turkey’s Asylum Dilemma and Process of Harmonization 15
(Dec. 2008) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Middle East Technical University),
available at http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12610257/index.pdf.
83. See generally Nansen Passport Donated to the Zohrab Center, supra
note 81.
84. Nansen Passport, NYU DEP’T OF MEDIA, CULTURE, & COMMC’N—DEAD
MEDIA
ARCHIVE,
http://cultureandcommunication.org/deadmedia/index.php/Nansen_Passport
(last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See Barnett, supra note 77, at 242–43.
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and other protections and liberties traditionally preserved
through the state.90
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “Declaration”) specifically enumerates statelessness as a matter of human rights.91 Article 15 of the Declaration, issued in December
1948, affirms that: “(1) [e]veryone has the right to a nationality
[and] (2) [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.”92 In 1950, the
United Nations created UNHCR whose responsibility toward
stateless persons began in 1951 with those persons who qualified as refugees.93
The first significant step toward identifying statelessness
took place at the 1954 Status Convention. UNHCR calls the
1954 Status Convention the “cornerstone of the international
protection regime for stateless persons.”94 According to
UNHCR, the 1954 Status Convention defines the de jure stateless person and establishes an internationally recognized status for stateless persons.95 This newfound status extended specific rights to stateless persons, most notably, the issuance of
limited identity and travel documents.96
The next significant development was the 1961 Statelessness
Reduction Convention.97 This convention focused on strategy
for eliminating statelessness. The most significant achievement
of the 1961 Convention was that it mandated signatory states
to respond to statelessness and not arbitrarily deprive persons
of citizenship. According to UNHCR:
Specific obligations relating to prevention and reduction of
statelessness are established under the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness and in regional treaties. The
1961 Convention requires that States establish safeguards in
legislation to address statelessness occurring at birth or later

90. See id.
91. Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
92. Id.
93. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57; see also supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
94. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989
U.N.T.S. 175.
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in life. The Convention also establishes obligations for States
in the event of State succession.98

The 1961 Convention became enforceable on December 13,
1975.99 By 2007, however, only thirty-two countries had acceded to it.100 The weak response from the international community damaged the intended strength of the convention.
Beyond the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
statelessness conventions, tangential conventions addressing
susceptible classes of people have identified statelessness as an
issue or recognized the right to nationality.101 The 1959 United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child claims in Principle 3 that “[t]he child shall be entitled from his birth to a name
and a nationality.”102
Massey summarizes the current UNHCR position on statelessness as follows:
UNHCR’s mandate has since been progressively developed to
the point where it . . . lists a number of measures to be taken
by UNHCR, States and other actors with respect to:
• The identification of “stateless persons and individuals with undetermined nationality”;
• The protection of “stateless persons”; and
• The prevention and reduction of “statelessness.”103

98. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57.
99. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 97.
100. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept.
28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
101. International instruments include: UDHR, supra note 91; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978),
660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 9, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S.
13; CRC, supra note 13; International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, opened for
signature Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/611, Annex I, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/611 (Dec. 13, 2006).
102. United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386
(XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Vol. I)
(Nov. 20, 1959).
103. Massey, supra note 65, at ii.
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C. The Global Stateless Population
The exact global population of stateless persons is unknown.
Estimates in 2010 by UNHCR put the stateless population at
approximately 12 million.104 Data aggregated by UNHCR estimates a 2009 population of nearly 6.5 million stateless persons.105 The following chart identifies the countries where
UNHCR has recorded stateless populations, along with the estimated number of stateless persons therein. It also presents
the size of these stateless populations as a percentage of its national population.
This chart may represent as little as half of the global stateless population. Countries with high populations of stateless
persons, such as China and the Dominican Republic, are not
included in UNHCR’s 2009 data.
Exhibit C. Stateless Persons as a Percentage of National Population
Stateless populations
in 2009106
Austria

2009
population107

Stateless
persons108

Percent
stateless

8,210,281

523

0.006

Azerbaijan

8,238,672

2,078

0.025

Belarus

9,648,533

7,799

0.081

Belgium

10,414,336

637

0.006

4,613,414

9,688

0.210

Burma (Myanmar)

48,137,741

723,571

1.503

Colombia

45,644,023

11

0.000

4,489,409

237

0.005

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatia

104. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57, at 4; see also Goris et al., supra note 52, at 4; see also UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY,
http://www.unhcr.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
105. HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION UNIT, STATELESSNESS: A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE
(Aug.
26,
2010),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181264.pdf.
POPULATION
STATISTICS
REFERENCE
DATABASE,
106. UNHCR
http://popstats.unhcr.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
107. All country populations are from the CIA World Factbook. The World
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
Factbook,
CENTRAL
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (last visited Oct.
8, 2013).
108. UNHCR POPULATION STATISTICS REFERENCE DATABASE, supra note 106.
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Stateless
persons108

Percent
stateless

5,500,510

3,263

0.059

83,082,869

64

0.000

1,299,371

104,813

8.066

Finland

5,250,275

2,407

0.046

France

64,057,792

1,078

0.002

Georgia

4,615,807

1,677

0.036

Germany

82,329,758

8,226

0.010

Greece

10,737,428

260

0.002

9,905,596

49

0.000

306,694

133

0.043

28,945,657

230,000

0.795

Hungary
Iceland
Iraq
Italy

58,126,212

793

0.001

127,078,679

1,525

0.001

Kazakhstan

15,399,437

7,649

0.050

Kenya

39,002,772

100,000

0.256

Japan

Kuwait

2,691,158

93,000

3.456

Kyrgyzstan

5,431,747

24,615

0.453

Latvia

2,231,503

344,263

15.427

34,761

6

0.017

3,555,179

3,902

0.110

491,775

177

0.036

2,066,718

1,911

0.092

Malaysia

25,715,819

40,001

0.156

Moldova

4,320,748

2,014

0.047

Mongolia

3,041,142

373

0.012

672,180

1,500

0.223

Nepal

28,563,377

800,000

2.801

Netherlands

Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia

Montenegro

16,715,999

5,034

0.030

Norway

4,660,539

2,860

0.061

Panama

3,360,474

1

0.000

Poland

38,482,919

865

0.002

Portugal

10,707,924

31

0.000

833,285

1,200

0.144

22,215,421

306

0.001

Qatar
Romania
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Stateless populations
in 2009106
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Slovakia

2009
population107

721

Stateless
persons108

Percent
stateless

140,041,247

50,000

0.036

28,686,633

70,000

0.244

7,379,339

16,700

0.226

5,463,046

911

0.017

South Korea

48,508,972

103

0.000

Spain

40,525,002

28

0.000

9,059,651

7,758

0.086

Sweden
Switzerland

7,604,467

67

0.001

20,178,485

300,000

1.487

Tajikistan

7,349,145

2,626

0.036

Thailand

65,905,410

3,500,000

5.311

Turkey

76,805,524

2,739

0.004

4,884,887

12,000

0.246

Ukraine

45,700,395

56,500

0.124

United Kingdom

61,113,205

205

0.000

Viet Nam

86,967,524

7,200

0.008

Syrian Arab Republic

Turkmenistan

Total Stateless

6,555,377

The small number of stateless persons as a percentage of national population suggests why statelessness is frequently overlooked. Stateless persons regularly make up tenths, hundredths, and thousandths of a percent of the population of the
countries in which they reside. For example, while statelessness affects only eight one-thousandths of a percent in Vietnam, it afflicts more than 7,000 individuals in the country.
Although the percentages per country are small, the total
stateless population rises to over 6.5 million as an international group.
D. Challenges for Adopting the Stateless
A primary challenge for the intercountry adoption of stateless
persons under the Hague Adoption Convention is that the convention requires a sending country.109 Technically, stateless
persons with no citizenship would have no formal sending
country.
109. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21.
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Receiving states would need to rely on the “host” state, most
likely the country where the stateless person is residing. In
many cases of statelessness, this is improbable or impossible.
First, the host country may be adverse to the group of stateless
persons (for instance, in Thailand where statelessness is a matter of illegal immigration).110 Alternatively, the country may be
logistically incapable of addressing stateless persons in cases of
de jure statelessness caused by ongoing wars or of de facto
statelessness in under-resourced countries.111 Understandably,
host countries might not want to become involved in the adoption of stateless persons for reasons such as the added expense
of administering an adoption facility.
It will take special legislation outside of the Hague Adoption
Convention to accommodate this process. Such legislation
would expand on the Intercountry Adoption Act and give the
State Department more power to receive children for adoption.
Specific legislation has already been proposed to assist stateless North Korean children, which will be addressed and analyzed in the following section.
III. THE NORTH KOREAN DILEMMA
Children of defecting North Korean mothers currently face a
statelessness dilemma.112 Many of these women leave North
Korea for China, which is problematic because China does not
legally recognize these women as refugees.113 These mothers
frequently give birth to children while in China.114 The fathers
are often Chinese men who either developed a relationship
with the North Korean mother, or fathered a child with a woman through the North Korean sex industry.115 The child conse-

110. Bleak Future, supra note 54.
111. Generally, if a nation does not have enough resources to care for its
own citizens, it does not prioritize stateless persons residing within its borders.
112. Estimates of North Korean stateless children are around 20,000, but
an accurate number is hard to estimate. Madison Park, U.S. Law Aimed at
Helping
North
Korean
Orphans,
CNN
(May
13,
2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/13/us/north-korea-adoption/.
113. Kimberly Hyo-Jung Campbell, De Facto Statelessness Places Adoption
on the Table for Children of N. Korean Women in China, HANKYOREH (June
18, 2010), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/426317.html.
114. See id.
115. Id.
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quently becomes stateless when the child’s mother is deported
from China or dies.
The children born from stateless North Korean mothers are
legally entitled to obtain Chinese citizenship, but face major
obstacles and practical challenges in doing so. In order to obtain Chinese citizenship, a child must receive hukou, a family
registry certificate.116 To receive hukou “the Chinese father
must submit legal proof including testimonies from witnesses
that his North Korean wife has been arrested and repatriated
back to North Korea. This is a requirement because the mother
may not be listed on the hukou due to her status as an illegal
migrant.”117
The difficulties in obtaining proof, including witness testimony, are significant hurdles for the Chinese father.118 Added to
these challenges, Chinese men are reluctant to register their
children because of the one-child policy.119 The stigma and potential legal obstacles associated with his wife’s illegal status
further disincline Chinese men toward registration.120
These children meet the requirements for de facto statelessness under category two: “Persons who are unable to establish
their nationality, or who are of undetermined nationality.”121
The children are unable to establish their nationality in China
and are practically prevented from returning to North Korea
and establishing their nationality there.122
North Korea is by no means the only example of de facto
statelessness or the only location where intercountry adoption
may provide a solution. An estimated one million stateless
children live along the Thai Burma border, and the countries
have been unable to find a workable solution.123
IV. ADOPTION AND STATELESSNESS
The Hague Adoption Convention poses some hurdles for intercountry adoption. While these hurdles are intended to protect the child, they also restrict the convention in ways that
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See Massey, supra note 65, at iii.
See id.
Bleak Future, supra note 54.
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prevent it from adapting or innovating to new global challenges, such as statelessness.
The first challenge for intercountry adoption will be to establish that the child is adoptable under Article 4. The following
chart lists countries with stateless populations and identifies
whether the Hague Adoption Convention has entered into force
in the corresponding country, or whether it falls outside the
arms of the Hague as a non-convention country. Correlating
data from UNHCR on stateless populations and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law shows that stateless
populations live largely outside the jurisdiction of the Hague
Adoption Convention.124
In total, UNHCR tracks 3,477,101 stateless people. This figure is short of the global estimate of 12 million.125 However,
correlating stateless data with contracting countries, 1,007,816
stateless persons live within Hague contracting countries. A
total of 2,469,285 live in non-contracting countries, or 71% of
the known global population of stateless persons.
Exhibit D. Countries with Stateless Populations Participating
with the Hague Adoption Convention
Entry into
force

Nonconvention

523

x

—

Azerbaijan

2,078

x

—

Belarus

7,799

x

—

637

x

—

9,688

—

x

723,571

—

x

11

x

—

Stateless populations in 2009
Austria

Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Burma (Myanmar)
Colombia

Stateless
persons

124. Statistics on statelessness are maintained by UNHCR. Stateless People
Figures, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c26.html (the latest
data available is from 2011). A current list of ratifications and signatories to
the Hague Adoption Convention is maintained by The Hague. Status Table,
HCCH,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
125. UNHCR’s count is much smaller than the global estimate. Presumably,
the discrepancy is explained by countries underreporting, failing to report, or
the challenges in identifying stateless populations.
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Stateless populations in 2009
Croatia
Denmark
Egypt

Stateless
persons
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Entry into
force

Nonconvention

237

—

x

3,263

x

—

64

—

x

Estonia

104,813

x

—

Finland

2,407

x

—

France

1,078

x

—

Georgia

1,677

x

—

Germany

8,226

x

—

260

x

—

49

x

—

133

x

—

Iraq

230,000

—

x

Italy

793

x

—

1,525

—

x

Greece
Hungary
Iceland

Japan

7,649

x

—

Kenya

100,000

x

—

Kuwait

93,000

—

x

Kyrgyzstan

24,615

—

x

344,263

x

—

6

x

—

3,902

x

—

177

x

—

Kazakhstan

Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg

1,911

x

—

Malaysia

40,001

—

x

Moldova

2,014

x

—

373

x

—

1,500

—

x

800,000

—

x

Netherlands

5,034

x

—

Norway

2,860

x

—

Panama

1

x

—

865

x

—

31

x

—

1,200

—

x

Macedonia

Mongolia
Montenegro
Nepal

Poland
Portugal
Qatar
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Entry into
force

Nonconvention

306

x

—

50,000

—

x

Saudi Arabia

70,000

—

x

Serbia

16,700

—

x

Slovakia

911

x

—

South Korea

103

—

x

28

—

x

7,758

x

—

67

x

—

300,000

—

x

2,626

—

x

3,500,000

x

—

2,739

x

—

12,000

—

x

56,500

—

x

205

x

—

7,200

x

—

6,555,377

37

21

Stateless populations in 2009
Romania
Russian Federation

Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Viet Nam
Totals

Stateless
persons

[Vol. 39:2

No statistically significant correlation exists between the size
of the stateless population and the host nation’s lack of entering into the Hague Adoption Convention.126 Thus, it is not true
that countries which allow stateless populations avoid or attract the Hague Adoption Convention.
After determining whether stateless populations exist in
Hague Adoption Convention countries, it is necessary to estimate the number of stateless children who might be orphaned.
Since this data has not been collected, this Article will extrapolate an estimation of orphaned stateless children based upon
regional estimates of orphaned children in the general population.

126. Correlation coefficient of 0.004, or 0.4%. In other words, the size of the
stateless population explains only 0.4% of why countries choose to enforce the
Hague Adoption Convention. A p value of 0.973 suggests that the findings are
not random.
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An orphan is defined by UNICEF as a child who has lost one
or more parents.127 For the purposes of adoption under the
Hague Adoption Convention, and in the spirit of keeping the
child united with his or her original parents, this Article rejects
the notion that a stateless orphan put up for adoption would
have lost only one parent. Accordingly, this chart estimates the
percentage of children who have lost both parents; the estimate
is based upon data gathered in various regions of the world in
2009. Among the regions listed, on average, one in twelve children has lost both parents. As shown in Exhibit E, estimated
orphaned stateless children are not insignificant in number;
there are millions in most countries identified in Exhibit E.
Exhibit E. Orphaned Stateless Children

Region

Africa, Sub-Saharan

Children who
lost one or both
parents due to
any cause

Children who
lost both
parents due to
any cause

Percent
who lost
both
parents

56,100,000

9,100,000

16

Eastern and Southern
Africa

27,600,000

4,900,000

18

West and Central Africa

26,400,000

4,100,000

16

6,400,000

470,000

7

71,400,000

5,300,000

7

South Asia

41,000,000

3,400,000

8

East Asia and Pacific

30,500,000

1,800,000

6

Latin America and
Caribbean

9,800,000

510,000

5

CEE/CIS

7,300,000

410,000

6

Developing countries

145,000,000

15,400,000

11

World

153,000,000

17,800,000

12

Middle East and North
Africa
Asia

The following chart estimates the number of stateless orphans in the world. By identifying the countries with stateless
populations, the chart multiplies tracked stateless populations
by regional estimates of the number of orphaned children who
have lost both parents. This figure estimates the number of

127. Press
Centre:
Orphans,
UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html (last updated May 25, 2012).
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stateless orphans by country. Kenya, Burma, Nepal, and Thailand have the largest estimated population of orphaned stateless children.
Exhibit F. Estimated Number of Orphaned Stateless Children
Stateless populations in
2009
Austria

Stateless
persons

Estimated stateless (lost both
parents)

Estimated
orphaned
stateless

523

11.6

0

Azerbaijan

2,078

7.4

4

Belarus

7,799

5.6

7

Belgium

637

5.6

0

9,688

5.6

—

723,571

8.3

1,994

11

5.2

0

237

5.6

0

3,263

11.6

4

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Burma (Myanmar)
Colombia
Croatia
Denmark
Egypt

64

7.3

0

Estonia

104,813

5.6

86

Finland

2,407

11.6

2

France

1,078

11.6

—

Georgia

1,677

5.6

1

Germany

8,226

5.6

2

260

11.6

0

49

5.6

0

Greece
Hungary
Iceland

133

11.6

0

Iraq

230,000

7.3

—

Italy

793

11.6

—

1,525

5.9

—

Japan

7,649

7.4

15

Kenya

Kazakhstan

100,000

17.8

1,183

Kuwait

93,000

15.3

—

Kyrgyzstan

24,615

7.4

47

344,263

5.6

277

6

5.6

—

3,902

15.3

9

Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
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Stateless populations in
2009
Luxembourg

Stateless
persons

Estimated stateless (lost both
parents)

729
Estimated
orphaned
stateless

177

11.6

0

1,911

5.6

—

Malaysia

40,001

7.4

52

Moldova

2,014

5.6

2

373

7.4

1

1,500

5.6

—

800,000

7.4

1,351

Netherlands

5,034

11.6

3

Norway

2,860

11.6

2

Panama

1

5.2

0

865

5.6

1

Macedonia

Mongolia
Montenegro
Nepal

Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation

31

11.6

0

1,200

7.3

1

306

5.6

0

50,000

5.6

—

Saudi Arabia

70,000

7.3

—

Serbia

16,700

5.6

12

Slovakia

911

5.6

1

South Korea

103

5.9

0

Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan

28

11.6

—

7,758

15.3

8

67

11.6

—

300,000

7.3

—

2,626

7.4

6

3,500,000

7.4

5,519

2,739

7.3

3

Turkmenistan

12,000

7.4

—

Ukraine

56,500

5.6

56

205

11.6

0

7,200

7.4

9

Thailand
Turkey

United Kingdom Northern
Ireland
Viet Nam
Total Stateless Orphans

11,077
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Exhibit F provides a rough but potentially conservative estimate of the number of stateless orphans worldwide. First, the
study is limited to data gathered by UNHCR. This data may
overlook unreported countries or stateless populations. Second,
given the vulnerability of the stateless population, stateless
children would conceivably be more vulnerable to the loss of
both parents. Stateless populations are often under-resourced
and underrepresented, making them more susceptible to poverty, disease, and human rights abuses.128 A hypothesis that
stateless populations suffer a higher rate of orphaned children
deserves closer study.
Further, the data does not necessarily represent all adoptable
orphans.129 Some orphans who lost both parents may have extended family (grandparents, siblings, and aunts and uncles)
who can take them in or communities who may act as surrogate families. Given that statelessness frequently occurs in
conditions of international conflict or forced emigration, stateless children may be more likely to lack extended family or
community.130 Once again, a hypothesis that stateless populations have few options for local resettlement deserves further
study.
The formal number of estimated orphaned stateless children
represented by Exhibit F may appear small—11,077 globally.131
This number, however, is significant. It is almost equivalent to
the total number of intercountry adoptions to the United States
in 2010.132 It is also nearly three times the number of children
adopted into the United States in 2009 from countries with
stateless population, a total of 4589 children in 2009.133 Most
importantly, perhaps, these orphaned stateless children are the
most vulnerable and most in need of adoption.
V. LEGISLATION AND INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
In March 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced
a bill proposing a solution known as the “North Korean Refu-

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See generally Milbrandt, supra note 2.
See supra note 125.
Milbrandt, supra note 2.
See supra Exhibit F.
See Bartholet, A Way Forward, supra note 8, at 688.
See supra Exhibit A.
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gee Adoption Act of 2010” (the “2010 Act”).134 The bill was referred to committee and reintroduced on April 8, 2011.135 The
bill passed the House on September 11, 2012, and the Senate
on January 1, 2013, under the new header of the “North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012” (the “2012 Act”).136 The bill “require[s] the Department of State regularly to brief appropriate
congressional committees on efforts to advocate for and develop
a strategy to provide assistance in the best interest of these
children.”137
The North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2010 legislation
read as follows:
A BILL
To develop a strategy for assisting stateless children from
North Korea, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘North Korean Refugee Adoption
Act of 2010’.
SECTION 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) thousands of North Korean children do not have
families and are threatened with starvation and disease if they remain in North Korea or as stateless refugees in surrounding countries;
(2) thousands of United States citizens would welcome
the opportunity to adopt North Korean orphans; and
(3) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security should make every effort to facilitate
the adoption of any eligible North Korean children.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
134. North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2012, H.R. 1464, 112th Cong.
(2012) (enacted).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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(1) FOREIGN-SENDING COUNTRY- The term ‘foreign-sending country’—
(A) means—
(i) the country of the orphan’s citizenship; or
(ii) if the orphan is not permanently residing in the
country of citizenship, the country of the orphan’s habitual residence; and
(B) excludes any country to which the orphan—
(i) travels temporarily; or
(ii) travels as a prelude to, or in conjunction with, his
or her adoption or immigration to the United States.
(2) HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘Hague countries’
means a country that is a signatory of the Convention
on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, done at The Hague on May
29, 1993.
(3) NON-HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘non-Hague
country’ means a country that is not a signatory of the
Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, done at The
Hague on May 29, 1993.
SECTION 4. STRATEGY ON ADOPTION OF NORTH
KOREAN CHILDREN BY UNITED STATES CITIZENS.
(a) In General- The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall develop a
comprehensive strategy for facilitating the adoption of
North Korean children by United States citizens.
(b) Considerations- In developing the strategy under
this section, the Secretary shall—
(1) consider the challenges that United States citizens
would encounter in attempting to adopt children from
North Korea who are currently living in Hague countries and non-Hague countries regardless of their legal status in such countries;
(2) propose solutions to deal with the situation in
which a North Korean child does not have access to a
competent authority in the foreign-sending country;
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(3) propose solutions to deal with North Korean children who are not considered habitual residents of the
countries in which they are located;
(4) evaluate alternative mechanisms for foreignsending countries to prove that North Korean children
are orphans when documentation, such as birth certificates, death certificates of birth parents, or orphanage documentation, is missing or destroyed;
(5) provide suggestions for working with South Korea
to establish pilot programs that identify, provide for
the immediate care of, and assist in the international
adoption of, orphaned North Korean children living
within South Korea;
(6) provide suggestions for working with aid organizations in Southeast Asia to identify and establish pilot
programs for the identification, immediate care, and
eventual international adoption of orphaned children
from North Korea;
(7) identify other countries in which large numbers of
stateless, orphaned children are living who might be
helped by international adoption; and
(8) propose solutions for assisting orphaned children
with Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers who
are living in China and have no access to Chinese or
North Korean resources.
(c) Reporting Requirement- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report that
contains the details of the strategy developed under
this section.138

The North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012 received significant changes from the proposed North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2010. Notably, the new proposed law withdraws
from an aggressive posture toward stateless children and intercountry adoption specifically.139 In particular, the 2010 version
of the Act mandated the development of a strategy to address
stateless North Korean children. The 2012 Act is weaker on
138. North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2010, H.R. 4986, 111th Cong.
(2010).
139. Id.
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implementation, instead requiring regular briefings related to
an analysis of “challenges that United States citizens would
encounter in attempting to adopt” stateless North Korean children. Even the modification of the title from the “Refugee
Adoption Act” to the “Child Welfare Act” illustrates the accepted Act’s weak stance toward stateless adoption in favor a
broader posture toward general welfare.140
HR 1464, the North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012, reads
as follows:
An Act
To express the sense of Congress regarding North Korean
children and children of one North Korean parent and to require the Department of State regularly to brief appropriate
congressional committees on efforts to advocate for and develop a strategy to provide assistance in the best interest of
these children.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘North Korean Child Welfare Act
of 2012’.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) hundreds of thousands of North Korean children
suffer from malnutrition in North Korea, and North
Korean children or children of one North Korean parent who are living outside of North Korea may face
statelessness in neighboring countries; and
(2) the Secretary of State should advocate for the best
interests of these children, including, when possible,
facilitating immediate protection for those living outside North Korea through family reunification or, if
appropriate and eligible in individual cases, domestic
or international adoption.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
140. H.R. 1464.
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(1)
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES- The term ‘appropriate congressional
committees’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘Hague country’
means a country where the Convention on Protection
of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, done at The Hague May 29, 1993, has
entered into force and is fully implemented.
(3) NON-HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘non-Hague
country’ means a country where the Convention on
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, done at The Hague May 29,
1993, has not entered into force.
SEC. 4. BRIEFINGS ON THE WELFARE OF NORTH
KOREAN CHILDREN.
(a) In General- The Secretary of State shall designate
a representative to regularly brief the appropriate
congressional committees in an unclassified setting on
United States Government efforts to advocate for the
best interests of North Korean children and children
of one North Korean parent, including efforts to address, when appropriate, the adoption of such children
living outside North Korea without parental care.
(b) Contents- The Secretary’s designee shall be prepared to address in each briefing the following topics:
(1) The analysis of the Department of State of the
challenges facing North Korean children residing outside North Korea and challenges facing children of
one North Korean parent in other countries who are
fleeing persecution or are living as de jure or de facto
stateless persons.
(2) Department of State efforts to advocate for the
best interest of North Korean children residing outside North Korea or children of one North Korean
parent living in other countries who are fleeing persecution or are living as de jure or de facto stateless
persons, including, when possible, efforts to address
the immediate care and family reunification of these
children, and, in individual cases where appropriate,
the adoption of eligible North Korean children living
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outside North Korea and children of one North Korean parent living outside North Korea.
(3) Department of State efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy to address challenges that United
States citizens would encounter in attempting to
adopt, via intercountry adoption, North Korean-origin
children residing in other countries or children of one
North Korean parent residing outside North Korea
who are fleeing persecution or are living as de jure or
de facto stateless persons, including efforts to overcome the complexities involved in determining jurisdiction for best interest determinations and adoption
processing, if appropriate, of those who habitually reside in a Hague country or a non-Hague country.
(4) Department of State diplomatic efforts to encourage countries in which North Korean children or children of one North Korean parent are fleeing persecution or reside as de jure or de facto stateless persons
to resolve issues of statelessness of North Koreans residing in that country.
(5) Department of State efforts to work with the Government of the Republic of Korea to establish pilot
programs that identify, provide for the immediate
care of, and assist in the family reunification of North
Korean children and children of one North Korean
parent living within South Korea and other countries
who are fleeing persecution or are living as de jure or
de facto stateless persons.141

VI. ANALYSIS OF NORTH KOREAN LEGISLATION
The 2010 Act worked to aggressively develop a mechanism
for the adoption of stateless children.142 The 2012 Act is more
in line with the Hague Adoption Convention, prioritizing family reunification.143 The original 2010 bill stalled in committee
and was reintroduced in 2011 before being reconstituted
through Senate amendments to the 2012 bill.144 The final bill
was, perhaps, a more palatable product for Congress. The 2012
bill appears to make few promises, instead requiring an update
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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on “efforts” to be shared at various briefing meetings. Alternatively, the 2012 Act may have been aligned with the original
drafters’ view that the aggressive language of the 2010 Act
would be traded for the opportunity to pass the bill. Whatever
the reason, several notable changes are apparent.
The 2012 Act fails to define “stateless.” The breadth of definitions for the terms statelessness and orphan may present challenges to the law. For instance, if the child of a mother remains
in a host country, but the mother is deported to a hostile country, the child may not legally be an orphan, but it may be impossible to reunite them. Furthermore, a child may not have
legal status in a host country, but may be receiving the same
rights as a citizen of the host country.
The 2012 Act seeks solely to establish a pilot program in the
Republic of Korea. While a singular pilot program may be a
necessary starting point, South Korea has a very limited stateless population.145 According to the recorded population of
stateless persons in Table F, South Korea reports 103 stateless
persons. Using the formula presented in this Article, it is estimated that none of these individuals would be orphaned children.146 Presumably, some orphaned stateless children must
reside in South Korea for this pilot program to be given consideration. If the legislation is interpreted narrowly, the potential
impact is likely much smaller than the regional statelessness
dilemma, and expansion to more countries may require new
legislation. Perhaps the legislation could be construed more
broadly, allowing stateless children from the region to enter
South Korea for the purpose of intercountry adoption processing. Such a plan would circumvent probable resistance
from the governments of Russia and China.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION
Future legislation should not be limited to North Korea.
Statelessness is a broad problem affecting millions of children,
and the North Korean dilemma is only a small portion of the
larger statelessness challenge. Statelessness is not a static
problem but a shifting global issue that evolves based on conflicts and nation-state policies. Legislation should be drafted
that explores the adoption of stateless people broadly, while
145. See supra Exhibit F.
146. Id.

738

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:2

prioritizing the Hague Adoption Convention ideals of family
reunification or resettlement in a country of origin.
This legislation would largely circumvent the Hague Adoption Convention by creating a parallel adoption system. While
the Hague Adoption Convention governs intercountry adoptions between contracting states, this legislation would create
an adoption system governed privately between two contracting states. In some cases of stateless adoption, the Hague
Adoption Convention would still apply because the stateless
child will reside in the host country contracting to the Hague
Adoption Convention. In many cases, particularly related to
countries with large stateless populations, the Hague Adoption
Convention will not apply since the host country will not have
ratified the convention.
The most important challenge in addressing statelessness
through adoption is the protection of children. Intercountry
adoption has experienced the negative effects of abuse of the
system.147 Inherent risks exist in developing a parallel intercountry adoption system for stateless children. Specifically,
there is a high risk that a black market will develop for adopting children if demand from receiving states is high.
Additionally, the definition of “foreign sending country”
should be changed to “foreign host country.” The countries may
not be sending the children, they may instead be disinterested
and essentially deporting the child to the custody of the receiving country.
“Compassionate circumstances” is inspired by a British system for adopting stateless individuals, particularly children.
The British system allows stateless people to become “subjects.”148 This method presents an alternative method for inter-

147. David M. Smolin, Child Laundering and the Hague Convetion on Intercountry Adoption: The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441, 442 (2010).
BORDER
AGENCY,
148. People
Who
Are
Stateless,
UK
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/britishcitizenship/othernationality/british
subjects/statelesspeople/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013)
A person who is stateless may be eligible to be registered as a British
subject. The Home Secretary can register any child under 18 as a
British subject but will normally only agree to do this if:


at least one of the parents is a British subject; and
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country adoption. For instance, instead of directly receiving
stateless individuals through intercountry adoption, the stateless person might become a subject of the receiving country,
then be adopted domestically in the receiving country (thereby
not triggering the Hague Adoption Convention).149 In Uganda,
a similar mechanism for sending children to receiving countries
is employed by foreign adopting parents to avoid the mandatory three-year residency requirement to adopt.150 In Uganda, the
adoptive parents ask for legal guardianship, which is granted
by the court. They then take the child to the United States as
the child’s guardian, where the adoption is then performed domestically.151
It must also be noted that stateless children may be denied
citizenship, yet have access to basic rights as a citizen of a host
country would. If treated as a resident, there may be no reason
to remove the child from the host country and it may be in the
best interest of the child to remain in the most familiar culture.
Recommended language for addressing intercountry adoption
of stateless persons is as follows:
A BILL
To develop a strategy for assisting stateless children.



the child is stateless and is not able to gain any other citizenship; and



there are compassionate circumstances, such as the child being unable to benefit from health care or education because
he/she does not have a passport; and



the family is facing deportation from the country in which
they live and the United Kingdom is the only country they
could go to if they were deported; and



the child is of good character (this applies only if the child is
aged 10 or older).

Id.
149. Id.
150. See UGANDA: Intercountry Adoption, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?coun
try-select=uganda (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
151. Id.

740

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:2

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘Stateless Children Adoption
Act’.
SECTION. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) millions of children worldwide do not have families
and are threatened with lack of access to education,
healthcare, and regular deportation if they remain as
orphaned, stateless refugees;
(2) thousands of United States citizens would welcome
the opportunity to adopt orphans;
(3) intercountry adoption is growing increasingly
scarce as sending nations reduce mechanisms for
child adoption and politicize intercountry adoption;
and
(4) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security should make every effort to facilitate
the adoption of any eligible stateless children.
SECTION. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) FOREIGN-SENDING COUNTRY- The term ‘foreign-sending country’—
(A) means—
(i) the country of the orphan’s habitual or emergency
residence; and
(B) excludes any country to which the orphan—
(i) travels temporarily; or
(ii) travels as a prelude to, or in conjunction with, his
or her adoption or immigration to the United States.
(2) STATELESS - The term ‘stateless’—
(A) means—
(i) an orphan who does not have a county of permanent citizenship;
(B) because
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(i) operation of law in their country of birth prevents
obtaining legal citizenship; or
(ii) the orphan’s country of birth or country of permanent citizenship no longer exists; and
(C) compassionate circumstances exist, such as the
child being unable to benefit from healthcare or education due to status as a stateless person.
(3) HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘Hague countries’
means a country that is a signatory of the Convention
on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, done at The Hague on May
29, 1993.
(4) NON-HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘non-Hague
country’ means a country that is not a signatory of the
Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, done at The
Hague on May 29, 1993.
SECTION. 4. STRATEGY ON ADOPTION OF
STATELESS
CHILDREN
BY
UNITED
STATES
CITIZENS.
(a) In General- The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall develop a
comprehensive strategy for facilitating the adoption of
stateless orphaned children by United States citizens.
(b) Considerations- In developing the strategy under
this section, the Secretary shall—
(1) identify countries in which large numbers of stateless, orphaned children are living;
(2) collaborate with foreign host countries to provide
immediate care to stateless children and families and
assist in accessing resources for family reunification,
or obtaining citizenship in their countries of birth,
countries of habitual residence, or countries of emergency residence;
(3) collaborate with foreign host countries to establish
pilot programs that identify, provide for the immediate care of, and assist in the international adoption of
orphaned stateless children living within their borders who cannot be reunified with family or properly
cared for in the host country;
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(4) collaborate with aid organizations to identify and
establish pilot programs for the identification, immediate care, and eventual international adoption of orphaned stateless children;
(5) develop a mechanism for foreign-sending countries
to prove that stateless children are orphans when
documentation, such as birth certificates, death certificates of birth parents, or orphanage documentation,
is missing or destroyed;
(6) develop a solution for United States citizens to
adopt stateless children who are currently living in
Hague countries and non-Hague countries regardless
of their legal status in such countries.

In practice, the greatest challenge for legislation and a program for adopting the stateless will be accurately determining
who is, and who is not, an orphan. The risk in adopting the
stateless is that non-orphaned children have the potential to be
exploited for adoption. Despite the risks, a solution will only
come through experimentation with programs determining the
adoptability of stateless children.
The legislation this Article recommends would open the opportunity for the adoption of stateless children more broadly,
allowing for adoption demand to address shifting statelessness
dilemmas. Furthermore, the recommended legislation would
more aggressively pursue the development of a legal mechanism for stateless adoption. This legislation would accomplish
many of the goals of the North Korean legislation while simultaneously opening doors to other sending nations.
CONCLUSION
Adoption of stateless children is not a first choice option. The
preferred response is that a child be reunified with its family.
However, when reunification is not an option, nations should
prioritize local and community adoption in the country where
the child resides. Unfortunately, there are circumstances
where the community response is hostile and unworkable; in
those cases, intercountry adoption may be the best solution.
Intercountry adoption is seen as an option when all other options have been exhausted. In many cases, the options for
stateless children will indeed be exhausted and intercountry
adoption will be the only solution for the protection of their
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best interests. The greatest hurdle to adopting the stateless is
the lack of an authorized channel to facilitate this process. Legislation will be needed to explore this solution and open the
pathway for this form of adoption. Within that channel, the
challenge will be determining whether the child is indeed an
orphan, particularly when stateless circumstances provide little or no paper trail on the child’s history. Nonetheless, we will
not develop a caring response to stateless children without experimentation and innovation. Exploring legislation and a new
legal mechanism will do just that, and it will present a lifechanging, and potentially life-saving, opportunity to thousands
of stateless orphans.

